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La actitud de los gobiernos hacia la
migración -interna y externa- ha cambia-
do en forma radical en años recientes.
Considerada anteriormente como evi-
dencia de una descomposición crónica
social y económica así como una seria
amenaza para el poder gubernamental
(bajo una urbanización acelerada), la
migración interna es vista actualmente
como un mecanismo muy importante
para la redistribución de recursos de las
localidades más ricas hacia las más
pobres y un medio vital para elevar el
ingreso de la población de estas áreas.    
El mismo cambio de percepción se está
presentando sobre la migración interna-
cional. En este caso, los flujos de remesas
de trabajadores que laboran en el exterior
hacia sus familias en sus lugares de ori-
Government attitudes to migration -
internal and external- have changed
radically in recent years. Formerly
seen as evidence of chronic social
and economic breakdown and
major threats to government power
(in accelerated urbanisation), inter-
nal migration is now seen as major
mechanism for the redistribution of
resources from richer to poorer
localities and a vital means of rais-
ing the incomes of the poor.
The same revision of view is affect-
ing international migration. Here
remittance flows from workers work-
ing abroad to their families at home
have become major components in
the foreign exchange earnings of a
number of countries. After some
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gen se han convertido en un componente
relevante en el ingreso de divisas de un
gran número de países.  Al cabo de cier-
tas reticencias, los gobiernos ahora han
venido aceptando la migración por traba-
jo, con el fin de facilitar y reforzar sus efec-
tos sobre la paliación de la pobreza. Sin
embargo, se presentan algunos proble-
mas con la pérdida de los trabajadores
más emprendedores y con mayor califi-
cación en los países en desarrollo.
¿Pueden reconciliarse los intereses en
juego -países en desarrollo, migrantes,
países desarrollados-?. La migración
temporal circulatoria con propósitos de
capacitación parecería ser el mejor resul-
tado, de tal manera que la migración se
convirtiera en un medio para potenciar el
capital  humano  de  los  países  en
desarrollo en la tarea de reducir la
pobreza mundial. 
Existen, no obstante, muchas opciones
sin  inmigración para  los países  desar-
rollados,  desde  reformas a sus merca-
dos laborales internos hasta la subcon-
tratación en el exterior. La  alternativa real
tiene que ver con la clase de mundo que
deseamos.     
Palabras clave: migración, desarrollo, re-
mesas, ayuda, pobreza.
reluctance, governments have come
to embrace emigration for work, to
facilitate and reinforce its effects on
the alleviation of poverty.
However, there are problems in the
loss of the most enterprising and
best-trained workers of developing
countries. Can the interests at stake
-developing countries, migrants,
developed countries- be reconciled?
Temporary circulatory migration for
the purposes of training would seem
to be the best outcome, so that
migration becomes a means to
enhance the human capital of devel-
oping countries for the task of
reducing world poverty.
There are, however, many options
for developed countries without
immigration - from the reform of
their domestic labour markets to
off-shoring. The real choice is about
what sort of world we want.
Key words: migration, development,
remittances, aid, poverty.￿
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n the recent past, migration in and from developing coun-
tries has most often been seen by governments as both abnormal and a sign
of chronic social breakdown - an implicit indictment of a society's capacity to
provide the social and economic conditions which permit people to lead an
adequate way of life in the place where they were born. Many newly indepen-
dent governments attributed internal migration to the damage inflicted by
colonialism - or capitalism - and assumed that the newly liberated powers of
the State could be used to end territorial inequalities  and  create  the  eco-
nomic homogeneity across the national territory which was supposedly the
promise of nationhood. In essence, population immobility, a settled nation,
was seen as the norm. In those societies where nomadism was a significant
phenomenon, the cruellest measures were undertaken to  force  people  to
settle (as in the well-known cases of the Roma in eastern Europe and the
Kazakhs in the interwar Soviet Union).
From the 1950s with the increasing tempo of urbanisation in newly inde-
pendent countries, particularly those which grew economically most swiftly,
this negative attitude towards migration was reinforced by the fear that the
modern economy and local government  would be overwhelmed  by the num-
bers of migrants and the  spread of  vast squalid squatter settlements and
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Ishanty towns. At the beginning of the 1980s, a UN survey reported that a major-
ity of governments in developing countries were dissatisfied with the internal
distribution of population, and were either actively pursuing or  considering
policies to change this distribution.  In some cases,  this led to draconian poli-
cies of expelling large numbers of families from urban areas or shifting popu-
lation by force to places where the government thought people should be
(Ethiopia is said still to be undertaking this kind of policy;  Mumbai and
Zimbabwe are currently still pursuing large-scale urban squatter clearances).
In possibly the most extreme case, in China, the bulk of the population was
immobilised by decree,  and others forced to move elsewhere; this pattern of
control was steadily undermined by clandestine migration (much as irregular
international migration undermines immigration controls), numbering possi-
bly some 80 million by the time of the beginning of reforms from 1978.
It is amazing that this set of negative attitudes towards migration -and the
associated singularly cruel policies of enforced relocation or immobilism-
could have been sustained so long.  For  the  evidence was abundant and  avai-
lable that migration was always not only one of the most powerful mechanisms
for the redistribution of income -in migrant remittances- from rich to poor
areas, but also an indispensable means whereby poor households were able to
diversify their incomes and ensure their survival (Harris, 2004; Ellis and Harris,
2004).  Thus, one of the first World Bank reports on China in the early 1980s
specifically criticised Chinese migration policies as forcing poor people to
remain trapped in poor localities instead of allowing them to escape to areas
of greater potential  (China was not alone, but undoubtedly the most thorough
in this perverse policy; at various times, other governments  pursued forced
population movements or tried to prevent them - for example, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Tanzania; and many more pursued population expulsions
from the cities or inter-provincial transfer). 
Now  that  the  agenda  for developing countries has been transformed,
supposedly, to a single-minded attempt to reduce poverty as embodied in the
Millennium Development Goals, governments have embraced a remarkable
reversal of policy by now seeking not to block migration or expel people from
the cities, but to facilitate mobility and the protection of families on the move.
Parallel to this recognition of the positive and important role of internal
migration in redistributing income between rich and poor areas, in alleviating
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￿poverty, has come the increasing awareness
1 that the same generalisations
applies to international migration. International remittance flows are emerging
as major sources of revenue for developing  countries.   Indeed,  of  all  the
various economic linkages between developed and developing countries that
are involved in the reduction of poverty -capital, aid, trade- one of the most
important, migration for work, is usually almost completely absent from the
discussion. 
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In the 1990s, the dynamic of Europe's labour market attracted much larger
numbers of regular and irregular workers from outside Europe, adding to the
inherited stocks of the 1960s - globalisation has, as it were, now become
inescapable on the streets of Europe's big cities. The by-product of this change
has been an extraordinary increase in the flow of worker remittances to their
home countries (increasing rapidly worldwide and now approaching US$150
billion -including  estimates of unofficial transfers in cash and kind,  of $300
billion- possibly six times the levels of official development aid, now approach-
ing $70 billion). The local value of these transfers is vastly increased by the
substantial differences in purchasing power between developed and develop-
ing countries. The multiplier effect further compounds the total economic
impact. 
In development terms, this is a remarkable and unexpected increase in the
revenues of developing countries. In addition, remittances are, in contrast to
other revenue and investment flows, counter-cyclical (they increase in a reces-
sion), do not generate counter-flows (payments for imports, profits on foreign
investment), and often go directly to those in need in some of the poorer local-
ities (Suro, 2003).
In sum, it has become apparent  that  one  of the  key  restrictions  on
developing countries' capacity to increase the incomes of their inhabitants is
the political control of immigration in developed countries; it is these controls
which frustrate the potential for developing countries to exploit to the full their
comparative advantage in low cost labour. 
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1 There have been a number of efforts to estimate the beneficial effects of the end, or of a reduction
of immigration controls on developing countries or the world economy - see Hamilton and Whalley
(1984); Walmsley and Winters (2002); Winters et al., (2003); Iregui (2002); Moses and Letnes (2002).There  is  a school  of  thought which rejects the argument that worker
remittance flows are an unmixed benefit. First, it is suggested that such
sources of income are inherently unstable, and that long-term dependence
upon them forces families to sacrifice local development (so that they could
earn an adequate income while staying at home) to migration, to the export of
labour resources. The point is strengthened by empirical studies which show
that often the bulk of remittance revenue is spent on immediate household
consumption, rather than devoted to saving and investment to expand the pro-
ductive base of the local area.  The  argument  reproduces  one of the tradi-
tional arguments against internal migration. However, it is difficult to see why
earning an income in a local factory is superior to earning one in a factory in
another country, particularly because the real income involved may be much
higher, so that it makes much more sense from the migrant's point of view. On
the other hand, any increase in the revenue to a poor area, expended on con-
sumption goods, relaxes one of the most powerful constraints on the develop-
ment of poor areas, the narrowness of the local market (because of low
incomes). So expenditure  does not have to be on investment goods to stimu-
late development - spending on foodstuffs, for example,  has, other things
being equal, the effect of raising the incentives of farmers to produce more; the
same is true of other sectors. Of course, this is not so if increased foreign
income is expended on imports and there are cases where this so, but in gen-
eral, this seems not to be the case (and continuing import protectionism in
developing countries reinforces this).    
Governments in developing countries, after some reluctance, have become
eager to harness this new source of revenues for development
2. The most strik-
ing case is not in Europe but in the area of much larger flows, between Mexico
and the US. The four hundred or so home-town clubs of the Mexican diaspora
in the United States have mobilised to finance development projects in their
home localities - to pave a road, build a health clinic, primary school, etc.
Mexican local, State and Federal governments have, in some States offered
three dollars to match each dollar remitted by a worker abroad, and re-aligned
domestic anti-poverty, health and educational programmes (Progresa, now
Oportunidades) to reinforce the impact of remittance flows (Escobar et al.,
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2 As also have financial institutions, development banks, aid donors, etc. - see DFID-World Bank
(2003).2003; O'Neil, 2003a). The Mexican government after long years of apparent
humiliation at the scale of emigration of its citizens, has moved to track their
destinations, keep in touch, supply Mexican identity cards (for irregular
migrants), facilitate cash transfers and offer advice.  Other countries have
developed schemes to utilise the scarce skills of their most highly skilled citi-
zens abroad to upgrade universities and the professions, and to start industries
of innovative technology (Lowell, 2001a; Findlay, 2001).
Migration, however, can remove from the labour force of a developing coun-
try the most skilled, energetic and enterprising workers, making much more
difficult the task of conquering poverty. It would be quite wrong for Europe to
seek to secure the welfare of its inhabitants at the cost of developing countries.
Are there ways in which migration could be turned into a positive reinforce-
ment, rather than a reduction, of development efforts?
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There is clearly a conflict of interests here - between the developed countries
need to recruit workers abroad to reinforce their existing  workforce (albeit
without necessarily encouraging settlement); the developing countries need to
retain their skilled workforce (but without losing the enrichment of their skills
through work abroad), and the interests of migrants themselves. At the risk of
oversimplifying the complexities,  on  what  basis  might  these interests be
reconciled? 
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The interest of governments in sending countries is in retaining the skilled
labour force while permitting skill-enrichment through experience and training
abroad. The system which would best meet this requirement would be tempo-
rary circular migration, with the migrant ultimately returning to their original
country with enhanced skills. The migrant, while abroad, retains their social
embeddedness in their home country and is discouraged from permanent exile
3.
Similarly, a source country government might encourage the emigration of the
low skilled in order to maximise remittances. In the course of this, the low-
skilled might enrich their capacities through training and work-experience, at
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3 Of course, this is most difficult where economic migration cannot be distinguished from the search
for asylum - the regime ruling in the country from which the migrant comes is intolerable.which stage, the source country might want to encourage the worker to return
with those skills, with savings, knowledge of market, contacts, etc. Again, tem-
porary circular migration might be the option most favoured here.
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As noted earlier, migration is one of the most important mechanisms for the
redistribution of wealth from rich to poor areas.  Most of this migration is inter-
nal. Take the example of China with something of the order of between 98 and
120 million migrants outside the province of their birth, remitting sums to fa-
milies left behind now nearly equal to sixty per cent of rural household incomes
(that is, a greater proportion than is earned in farming) 
4. In terms of helping
the poorest families to survive, it is an enormous injection of income. It is also
a vivid illustration of migration as means to diversify the income of poor house-
holds (particularly in the agricultural off-season) and so allowing most house-
holds to meet the costs of continuing to live in the same place.
International migration is much more costly to undertake once, let alone to
circulate many times. However, its great advantage is in the difference in pur-
chasing power values between developed and developing countries, a low
income in the first becomes a middle income if spent in the second - what we
might call the "international migrants bonus". Not only does this make the
incentive to work abroad initially much stronger than that suggested simply by
wage differences compared at official exchange rates, it makes for a willing-
ness to work at wages well below those expected in a developed country. That
however is only true if migrants do not spend where they earn. If they are
obliged to support themselves in the developed country, a low income will yield
only the standard of living of the poor - the migrant's bonus is lost.
It is here that immigration controls exercise their most destructive effect by
preventing  circulation and forcing migrants to settle as the condition of con-
tinued access to work.
The US experience is a vivid illustration of this. Mexicans have traditionally
circulated seasonally for work to the north. With the 1986 and 1992 immigra-
tion acts and steadily increased expenditure, successive Presidents have
attempted to make the US-Mexico border impassable. There have been a num-
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4 Report of a survey of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, Financial Times, 26th Feb.2004.ber of negative effects (Cornelius, 2001; Massey et al., 2002), but one of the
most interesting has been the fact that Mexicans have been obliged to settle
for much longer periods to recoup the increased costs and avoid the increased
risks of border crossing. One study suggests that in the early eighties, Mexican
irregular migrants stayed on average three years in the US; in the mid-1990s,
nine years. With nine years, the migrant brings or acquires a spouse, puts chil-
dren into school and so, in effect, becomes a settler, albeit generally a poor
one.  Thus,  the  perverse  effect  of tighter control is not at all that it ends
irregular migration but rather forces circular migrants into settlement.
Wherever immigration controls are introduced, it ends circulation and
forces migrants into "immigration", that is, settlement. It substitutes for tem-
porary work abroad in order to continue living at home, permanent exile. In
terms of the interest of worker-migrants, temporary circulation for work, we
can infer, would perhaps be the best form of migration so that they are able to
return with their earnings - and benefit from the bonus.
There are many suspicions in developed countries here, even though, with-
out controls, it is commonly observed that migrants circulate. With the 1890s
decline in trans-Atlantic transport costs, nearly half Italian migrants to the US
up to 1914 returned to Europe; 30-40 per cent of Portuguese, Croatians,
Serbs, Hungarians and Poles (Baines, 1991). In the European Union, it is noted
that immigrants of particular countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal) started to
return when those countries joined the Union (and so acquired the right to cir-
culate). Furthermore, Constant and Zimmerman (2003) estimate that 60 per
cent of existing guest-workers in Germany are repeat migrants (also
Eichengreen, 1994, Dustman, 1996)
5. 
However, public debate in developed countries too frequently assumes all
who enter wish sooner or later to settle, to join the national club. Of course,
the sheer numbers entering show this not to be the case. Legal temporary
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3 The German guestworker case is often cited to support the proposition that "there is nothing so per-
manent as a temporary worker". However this is a misjudgement since the introduction of immigration
controls themselves powerfully affected behaviour: (i) employers pressed the government to keep work-
ers because the suspension of the programme meant that there could now be no replacements; (ii) work-
ers tried to stay because they recognised that, if they left, there would  be no repeat opportunity to work
in Germany; (iii) in any case, a significant proportion of guestworkers did leave Germany - see Werner
(2002); Constant and Massey (2002). There are many other schemes of circular migration that have
worked effectively - for example, the US-Mexico Braceros scheme, contract labour schemes in the Persianwork  has  the  effect of opening a legitimate space between entering and
working in a country and settling or joining the club. Such systems already
exist and with proper management, succeed without great losses. 
However, the existence of two classes of inhabitant -those who are mem-
bers and those who are not- raises questions about the nature of the nation-
State, democratic government and sovereignty which lead to legitimate appre-
hensions in the existing citizenry. These are, perhaps, of lesser significance in
remedying the economic problem - labour to staff the developed country's
economy and a means of pumping resources to developing countries.
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The developed countries of Europe seek to compensate for any demographic
decline (and changing age-structure) in the labour force as well as recruiting
scarce skills as the structure of the economy changes more swiftly than the
training system - but to do so without offending the xenophobic sensibilities of
the settled electorate, that is, without significant permanent settlement.
Temporary circular migration would meet the first requirement - workers
migrating for one or two years to work, build their savings and return home.
There would be many problems of short-term adjustment (particularly in lan-
guage competence), in managing the social security system, etc., but none
which render circulatory migration, in principle, impossible.
The second requirement is more difficult. The permanent recruitment and
retention of highly skilled workers from developing countries is perhaps only
sustainable  if  the  developed  countries  pay - either to  repay the costs of
training existing skilled workers or of future skilled workers (something already
undertaken by some aid programmes). 
However, a compromise might benefit both countries -that is, if all migra-
tion became training and work experience, modelled on foreign student and
work-experience programmes: that is to say, a partnership programme to
enhance the human capital of developing countries for the attack on world
poverty. Aid programmes might be usefully refocused in support of such a
campaign.
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Gulf, etc. In the case of the Mexico-Canada agricultural labour programme, in the 28 years of its opera-
tion (with 12,500 workers involved in 2002), no Mexicans overstayed their visas, and 5 per cent returned
to Mexico before their visas expired - O'Neil (2003b).￿
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Official aid programmes to developing countries play a great variety of roles,
from supporting macro economic balance and reforms, financing responses to
emergencies, to projects. Project aid has a mixed record of achievement and
can, in certain circumstances, lead to the subordination of the perception of
the developing country's requirements to the interests of the donor. This does
not happen with remittances which carry no political strings.  However, the lack
of local development agents can jeopardise the outcome of aid projects.
Donors employ governments in developing counties, consultants and, increas-
ingly NGOs to play the role of local implementing agents. However, with circu-
latory migration and return, there could be an immense number of develop-
ment agents in returnees. Aid programmes could then be employed to rein-
force the efforts of returnees, the impact of remittance flows and, as now, the
efforts of developing country governments and NGOs
6.
Enhancing human capital is widely seen as one of the most important
issues in economic development and circulatory migration can contribute to
this aim. On the one hand, temporary migration includes a large number of
students who come to Europe to study. In many cases, they are also allowed to
work. On the other, if we were to think of all circulatory migrants on the model
of students (including in study, work experience, on the job training, and
enhancement of professional skills), then migration could simultaneously meet
Europe's  requirements  for  workers  and  enhance  the  human capital of
developing countries through returnees. In addition, treating all migrants on
the same basis would militate against the current tendency to create a two
class system in which the highly skilled are able to move fairly freely, work and
settle, but the low skilled are expected to be tied to the soil of their native
place. Aid programmes in conjunction with host country educational institu-
tions, could be enlisted to organise the training, education and professional
development programmes of migrants, track returnees, and offer follow up
programmes  in  the student's country of origin,  of  aid  and  support for
development projects
7.
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6 There have been proposals in Europe to link aid to migration, but less to reinforce development
than punish governments for not preventing emigration.
7 There have been many experiments here - see, for example, the Belgian Migration for Development
programme, the French programme with Mali, etc.￿
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The national 'management of migration' -as in Britain- exists, less for any
defensible  economic  reasons,  but  above  all to reassure  the citizens in
developed countries that their way of life will not be overwhelmed. Here,
national politics and the fears of electorates confront the pressures generated
in the domestic and world labour markets to integrate in a global economic
order. We are well advanced in comparable processes in trade and capital, even
though still very far from free trade. But it would seem most likely that a simi-
lar evolution will occur in migration to free and unrestricted migration - if effi-
ciency and equity are to be secured. However, in present circumstances, this
aim is so far from reality, it must seem utopian (as would have seemed in 1950
the degree of free trade achieved now)
8.
The problems are at their most severe in the transition to the global inte-
gration of what were semi-closed self-sufficient national labour markets.
However, if the transition is slow enough, there is time for electorates to
become accustomed to unprecedented levels of mobility and the relocation of
parts of the world economy - for example, from the Atlantic area to east, south
and south-east Asia. National economies become less territorially bounded
economic complexes,  more  logistical  and management centres for unbound-
ed global networks, including many activities which are beyond the authority or
even knowledge of the governments concerned.
At the moment, it  is the dynamic and changing labour demand in the deve-
loped countries -even when this coincides with high levels of unemployment -
which induces regular and irregular immigration. The expansion of the Union
has temporarily masked the effect of labour shortages. The west European
states, particularly Britain, are now recruiting labour from the new accession
States, and this can be perpetuated if Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey join the
Union.  But  the  new  accession  States  also  have a demographic problem,
and if Europe as a whole begins to reach its aspired rates of growth, these
reserves could rapidly be exhausted. The more rapidly the European economy
expands, the less self-sufficient in labour supply and skill-mix it seems to
become. 
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8 For the economic issues in the transition, see Harris (2003).￿
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But in the process of transition to an integrated global economy, there are
many intermediate stages. There are also many reforms -many of them already
underway- which may reduce the pressures for migrant workers:  
Outsourcing/offshoring is the other side of the coin to migration - in the one
case, economic activity moves to the worker, in the other, the worker moves to
the work. The full resources of outsourcing have barely been perceived as yet.
Manufacturing -with the "unbundling" of the commodity- and the digitalisa-
tion/codification of many services, supported by new technology, have allowed
the emergence of global supply networks and global patterns of collaborative
specialisation.
But the potential for non-tradables to become tradable is just beginning -in
off-shore universities, off-shore medical treatment, retail trade zones, etc.
There is some possibility that partnerships may replace one-way flows of
skilled workers - instead of Indian doctors or Filipina nurses moving to, say,
Manchester hospitals in permanent exile, partnerships between hospitals in
Britain, India and the Philippines for the mutual exchange of staff and patients
can enrich all (as well as lower costs). 
Furthermore, the development of offshore retirement centres can much
reduce the demand for labour-intensive services in the developed countries.
Finally, for the migration which remains necessary, there are many mecha-
nisms other than immigration, forced settlement and permanent exile. We
have discussed circulatory migration as a mode of enriching human capital.
But contract labour,  operating within companies (as do the staff of multina-
tional corporations at present), circulating between countries for the purposes
of major works - construction, highway building and maintenance, hospital and
a) later retirement ages, tax and other efforts to reduce non-employment
and the numbers on disability support;
b) more careful use of skills so that, for example, nurses take over some
responsibilities of physicians; teachers are given assistants; skilled
workers are able to cover more ranges of skilled work (as in construc-
tion, etc.);
c)  redoubled efforts, including allowing pay to rise significantly, to ensure
people are able to acquire skills in demand.￿
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city cleaning services - is another option. The Doha GATS round of discussions
might be an occasion to discuss such issues in connection with what is known
as Mode 4, but at present this seems unlikely to produce dramatic results.
However, we are only on the threshold of ageing and the contraction of the
developed countries' labour force; the need of Western multinational service
companies (banking, insurance, transport, IT) to operate in the larger develop-
ing countries, combined with the growing shortage of unskilled labour in the
developed countries could well force concessions in a later trade round.
The danger is that the fears will so overwhelm us, some will try to reverse
the process of integration, to draw back and restore the old national fortress-
es.  War is the great force which drives the world back to the old world,  the tri-
umphs of which were two World Wars in the last century.  After two hundred
years or so of building nation-States and the appropriate national identities, at
least some people might find the cumulative effect of these processes under-
mines psychic stability - and the economics of labour migration become disas-
trously mixed with the politics of personal identity. 
The dangers in mismanaging the transition to global integration are thus
considerable - but the rewards in terms of the reduction of world poverty even
greater. ￿
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